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Recreation Demand and Residential Location 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We use the properties of competitive location equilibrium to study the demand for recreation and the choice of primary residence location. Location-specific recreation and employment lead to pooling equilibria in which consumers reside according to their preference for recreation. In general, the stronger the taste for recreation, the greater the attraction of living close to the recreation site and the lower the demand for other goods, including housing. We explore the effects of trip frequency, trip length, and recreation cost on the spatial distribution of consumers. We also consider the effect of the wage rate on recreation and location demands. 相似文献
83.
Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling. 相似文献
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Peter Humphreys 《Telecommunications Policy》2009,33(1-2):109-110
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Peter Binns 《Business ethics (Oxford, England)》1994,3(3):174-179
Doing business ethics and conducting ethical business has to be much more than conducting a rational enquiry. Much also depends on the motivation of individuals and how a positive moral vision of business can unite intellectual and affective approaches to the conduct of business. The author is a lecturer in Philosophy at Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, and a Research Associate at the Local Government Centre at Warwick Business School. He is also an independent organisation development consultant specialising in helping organisations develop their learning processes and value-based forms of leadership. 相似文献
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Food stamp recipients may lack access to larger stores, reducing the availability of nutritious food. Reliance on smaller stores may have undesirable impacts. Policy alternatives include limiting food stamp redemption to larger stores and subsidizing store development. I estimate that limiting redemption to supermarkets and grocery stores, or supermarkets alone, results in losses ranging from $499.2 million to $1.05 billion, or $1.17 billion to $2.44 billion (respectively) annual loss in food stamp recipient welfare nationwide. The impact of improving access is also significant, ranging from $333.6 million to $931.2 million. 相似文献